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MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY TO
ULTIMATE CONSUMERS
I INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer of goods has been the subject of much discussion in recent
years because of the modern industrial and commercial trend to increase the number of commercial transactions the average citizen is
engaged in and to separate these parties further and further apart
in the transaction. The manufacturer or processor no longer sells
directly to the consumer of the goods; a multitude of middlemen,
wholesalers, jobbers, distributors and retailers have been interposed
between them. This trend has made necessary a corresponding change
in the law applicable to them, the judiciary of this country still being
in the process of this change. Among the areas affected by this change
are the law of implied warranties and the law of negligence as applied
to manufacturers. This article will attempt to indicate the distinctions
between these fields and the application of each.
II IMPLIED WARANTIES
History discloses very little concern in the law for the buyer of
goods. Before the founding of the action of special assumpsit, the rule
was indeed caveat emptor, for the buyer of goods had little protection
outside of his own business acumen and his often misplaced faith in his
vendor." The slight protection which was afforded him was the extension of the action of trespass on the case to include deceit,2 if the
seller was improvident enough to make any fraudulent misrepresentations, and breach of implied warranty,3 if he had the temerity to sell
adulterated or contaminated food or drink. Both of these actions
sounded in tort, however, the latter being an outgrowth of the former,
and were based on a public policy of protecting the buyer from harm
rather than to insure any contractual rights.4 This gave some protection
to the buyer, but only because the good of society as a whole intervened and not because of any independent rights of his own. There
were no implied warranties as to quality, as known today, in the early
common law.5
When the action of special assumpsit came into existence,6 the
1 1 WILusToN ON SALES (2nd

ed.. 1924) 368, §195.

BL. CoiiM. §166 (Lewis' ed.)
Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 HARv. L. RExv. 1, 8 (1888) ; Statute or Pillory

23

3

and Trumbul and of the Assize of Bread and Ale, 51 Hen. 3, stat. 6 (1266)

1 Stat. 47.
Ames, History of Assumpsit, ibid.
5 1 WILUsToN ON SALES (2nd ed., 1924) 440, §228; See also Prosser, The Implied
Warranty of Merchantible Quality, 27 MiNN. L. REv. 117, 121 (1943) and
Feezer, .Manufacturers'Liability, 37 MIcH. L. REv. 1 (1938).
6 See Ames, History of Assumpsit, supra,,n. 3.
4
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buyer of goods acquired contractual rights with regard to those goods
and could depend on these rights to protect himself, and hence the action on the case for breach of implied warranty fell into disuse. Because of its similarity to the express contractual promises of assumpsit,
the tendency of the courts was to place them together in the law of
contracts without regard to their historical origin. 7 The warranty which
arose only in the case of food and drink was extended to include all
goods sold and the contractual remedy applied indiscriminately to all
of them. Naturally, this led courts to insist on the elements of contract
as a condition to recovery for breach of implied warranty. When the
Uniform Sales Act" was formulated and adopted it included all warranties, express and implied, as part of the law of sales, which is contractual, and it was assumed that the implied warranties therein mentioned 9 were contractual in nature and were so applied by the courts.10
Hence it is seen that the action for breach of implied warranty, which
was originally an action in tort, has taken on the character of a contract
action with all of its rigid requirements of agreement, consideration
and privity. It is this latter requirement which has led courts to a great
diversity of opinion as to the nature of the action.
A few courts, in view of this historical background, have held that
an action for breach of implied warranty is not contractual at all," but
is simply based on public policy and hence no privity should be required. 12 Another court has merely based it on public policy without
finding any other consideration necessary. 3 This policy is supposedly
based on the necessity of protecting a remote vendee from the danger of harm without compensation which has become possible due to
the vast complexity of modem commercial transactions. This view
7

Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability to Persons Other Than Their Immediate
Vendees, 24 VA. L. Rlv. 134, 149 (1937).
sWis. STATs. (1951). Chap. 121.
9 UNIFORM SALES AcT, §15: ". . . (1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods
are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose. (2)
Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods
of that description (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there
is an implied warranty that the goods shall be of merchantible quality."
10 "To sustain a finding that there was a breach of warranty express or implied,
there must have been evidence of a contract between the parties, for withouta contract there could be no warranty." Welshausen v. Charles Parker Co.,
83 Conn. 231, 76 Atl. 271 (1910).
"'Jacob Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. 2d 828 (1942).
It was there stated: "The policy of the law to protect the health and life of
the public would only be half served if we were to make liability depend on
the ordinary contractual warranty." See also: Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200
Fed. 322, 323 (D.C. Cir., 1912).
12 Ibid. See also Feezer, Manufacturers'Liability, supra,n. 5.
13 "The question of privity should not protect one who sells unmerchantible
goods where inspection will not disclose the defect." Kruper v. Proctor &
Gamble Company, 113 N.E. 2d 605 (Ohio, 1953).
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is indicated in the language used in Baxter v. Ford Motor Co." where
the court, although speaking of advertisments as express warranties,
recognizes this modern trend as the basis for doing away with the requirement of privity. It was there said:
"Since the rule of caveat emptor was first formulated, vast
changes have taken place in the economic structure of the English
speaking peoples. Methods of doing business have undergone a
great transition. Radio, billboards and the products of the printing press have become the means of creating a large part of the
demand that causes goods to depart from factories to the ultimate consumer. It would be unjust to recognize a rule that
would permit manufacturers of goods to create a demand for
their. products by representing that they possess qualities which
they, in fact, do not possess; and then, because there is no privity
of contract existing between the consumer and the manufacturer, deny the consumer the right to recover if damages result from the absence of those qualities, when such absence is
not readily noticeable."
The courts which have eliminated the requirement of privity have
based their decisions on the implied warranty of merchantibility of
Section 15, Subsection (2) of the Uniform Sales Act. They have gone
to great pains to distinguish between warranties implied-in-fact and
those, like the implied warranty of merchantibility, which are impliedin-law, and, although they admit the former to be contractual in nature, have insisted that the latter are not contractual at all but are
merely matters of policy embodied in the statute.' 5 Admitting that the
sources of these two different types of warranties are not the same,
it would still seem that both were intended to be part of the contract
of the parties to a sale, the one by the intent of the parties themselves,
and the other by the intent of the legislature. As part of the contract
then, they would both be subservient to the actual existence of a con
tract, and certainly could not be called into being without a contract.
Although implied-in-law, such a warranty is still dependent on the
contractual relationship to support its existence.
Another difficulty in the elimination of privity as a requirement for
recovery on breach of implied warranty is the failure to distinguish between a breach of warranty which will result in danger to human life,
which was the subject of the old action on the case in tort, and breach
of warranty which will merely result in the loss of the purchaser's
bargain. Liability for the former would seem to rest in a tort obligation
where the public policy is easily understandable; liability for the latter,
1468

Wash. Dec. 384, 12 P.2d 409 (1932), aff'd. on rehearing, 70 Wash. Dec. 2,

15 P.2d 1118 (1932).

15

"It should also be remembered that the implied warranty of merchantibility
is in a sense one imposed by law although frequently spoken of as quaisi-contractual." Kruper v. Proctor & Gamble Company, supra, n. 13.
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however, possibly should be limited to an action in contract. In the one
case privity would have no place; in the other privity would be- absolutely essential.
Due to the historical grouping of these two types of breaches,
courts have come up with a variety of results, depending on the facts
of the case at hand. A tendency has grown to retain the requirement
of privity, but to satisfy the requirement in the case of personal injuries by a variety of fictions. 16 These fictions, rather than simplifying
the basic concepts involved, have only served to confuse the issues and
prevent a logical analysis of the problem. To create a fiction to satisfy a supposedly undesireable requirement is a fallacious process in
that it replaces one faulty proposition with two faulty propositions.
Privity has an old and honored place in contract law and should not be
sacrificed to the exigencies of one particular situation.17
18
Wisconsin has adopted the position of the majority of the states
and has maintained that a manufacturer's liability for breach of implied warranty only extends to those with whom he has a contractual
privity. The Wisconsin court reasons thus:
"To assert a right, however, based upon a breach of warranty, express or implied, it is necessary that the required elements of a contract be present. The express language of the
statute above cited (Uniform Sales Act, Sec. 15) and here invoked by plaintiff makes the rule there declared applicable as
between buyer and seller, and manifestly is not intended to
create a liability of the seller towards any person outside of such
so defined and limited contractual relationship. The words
'buyer' and 'seller' connote a relationship and obligations created
by contract, as distinguished from obligations imposed by law.
Unless there be privity of contract the general rule is that there
is no liability for a breach of the contract to outsiders."' 9
This position has been held by the Wisconsin Supreme Court right
up to the present day 20 and represents the viewpoint with the best
16Among the theories presented are: (1) the manufaiturers' duty to the public
brings the consumer within the privity, Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416,
200 N.W. 155 (1924) ; (2) the warranty runs with the goods like a covenant
which runs with land, Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fort Worth v. Smith, 97 S.W.
2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss.
876, 111 So. 305 (1907) ; (3) these are third party beneficiary contracts, Dryden v. Continental Baking Co., 11 Cal. 2d 33, 77 P.2d 833 (1938),. Ward Baking
Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1946) ; and (4) the consumer
is the assignee of the retailer's rights, Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189
Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382. (1920). See also Comment, 21 CrNN L. R-v. 460
(1952).
17 Cf. Feezer, Manufacturers'Liability, supra, n. 5.
2 1 WILLISTON ON SALEs (2nd ed., 1924) §244; Miller, Liability of a Manufacturerfor HarmDone by a Product,3 SYP. L. REv. 106, 118 (1951) ; Bohlen,
Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other Than Their Immediate Vendees,
45 L. Q. REv. 343 (1929).
19 Prinson v. Russos, 194 Wis. 142, 215 N.W. 905 (1927).
20 "To permit recovery for breach of warranty by an ultimate buyer against the
manufacturer or processor of an article of food there must be privity of con-
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basis in history and logic. Along with the rest of the majority, Wisconsin has inexorably tied the term "warranty" to contract law and hence
finds it quits logical not to give a right of action on the contract to
one who is not a party thereto. Since this word does almost universally
connotes the imposition of a contractual obligation, a change in the requirement of privity, no matter how desireable the result might be,
would require for its justification too great an alteration in the concept
of privity in general contract law.
It should be noted thaat the original tort liability for what was
called breach of implied warranty only extended to food and drink
which was intended for human consumption, 21 while the term "implied
warranty" as used in the Uniform Sales Act 22 has no such limitation.
In view of the above fact, as well as in view of the fact that the majority of the courts already assume the necessity of privity, it would
seem to be better to restrict warranties to contractual relation ships and
extend the general tort liability in this field to cover the non-privity situations. This would allow logical and consistent development along
both lines without the confusion which arises from permitting them to
become interdependent.
III NEGLIGENCE AND TORT LIABILITY
The general rule which is the basis of liability in negligence is that
every person must so conduct himself so as to avoid all unreasonable
risk of harm to another. Under this rule, a manufacturer or processor
is also required to comply with the standard of due care with respect
to his goods. However, an early English decision 23 refused to extend
the manufacturer's liability for negligence to persons who were not in
contractual privity with him because it was felt that injury to such a
person was too remote to come within the requirement of natural
and probable causation. This conclusion was mere obiter dicta to the
decision inasmuch as it was actually based on breach of implied warranty, but succeeding courts seized upon this language to permit
what was then considered to be good policy. It was felt that to make
a manufacturer of goods liable to persons with whom he had no contractual relations for defects would in effect make him an insurer for
the whole world against all possible harm that might result from his
product, and that this would be too great a burden to place on the manufacturer. Thus it was that, in effect, privity was made a requirement
for recovery on the grounds of negligence as well as breach of
24
implied warranty.
tractual relations between them." Cohan v. Associated Fur Farms, Inc., 261
Wis. 584, 53 N.W. 2d 788 (1952).
21 Supra, n. 3.
22 Supra, n. 9.
2SWinterbottom v. Wright, 10 M & W 109, 11 L. J. Ex. 415, 152 Eng. Rep. 402

(1842).
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It was not long before the courts began to feel that it was necessary
to make exceptions to this rule. The first exception was made in the
case of inherently dangerous articles. It was felt that if the manufacturer of such articles was negligent in their making, he should be
liable to persons harmed regardless of any contractual relationships
between them. Thus, in Thomas v. Winchester,25 where a manufacturer
mislabeled dangerous drugs, he was held liable to the ultimate user
without the 'privity relationship. Later, in the leading case of McPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,26judge Cardozo extended this exception to
articles not inherently dangerous, but rendered imminently so by reason of their defective manufacture. Here, however, instead of being
stated as an exception to the requirement of privity, the rule was
stated as a requirement necessary to the rising of a tort duty to the
ulimate consumer or other third parties. This is a better statement of
its nature, but courts tend to continue to consider it as another exception to the privity requirement. 27 To these exceptions a third was
added with respect to articles intended to preserve or affect human life,
limb or health, 28 but situations in this third class could probably be
better classified in the other two.
The common statement of the rule declares that a manufacturer
will not be liable for negligence to persons who are not in privity with
him except in the above situations. From this statement of the rule
it is seen that the necessary elements of duty, arising from forseeable
harm, and breach of that duty, which elements constitute negligence,
are assumed, and liability hence must be denied on the grounds of
causation. The exceptions to the rule then, must be the situations in
which the manufacturer's negligence is the natural cause of the consumer's harm, and all cases not within one of the exceptions are without relief because of lack of causation. And even the necessity courts
find of bringing a case within one of the exceptions to the rule gives
at least implied recognition to the rule itself. On the other hand, Cardozo's statement of the rule in the McPherson case, including articles
imminently dangerous by reason of their defective manufacture, was
based on forseeability. In other words, a manufacturer would only be
able to reasonably forsee harm in the case of inherently dangerous
or defective articles, and hence only in those cases would arise a duty
to use due care. In both cases, privity is being used as a cloak, either
for causation or for forseeability, and would allow recovery or denial
of recovery in identical circumstances to turn solely on the requirement
2465 C. J. S. Negligence §100, 619 and cases cited, note 60.
256 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852) ; see also Huset v. J. I. Case Threashing
Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865. (8th Cir., 1903)
26217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050. (1916).
2765 C.J.S. Negligence §100, 629 and annotations, note 89.
28
Johnson v. Stoddard, 310 Mass. 232, 37 N.E. 2d 505. (1941).
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of privity without regard to its actual effect on foreseeability or causation. At one time it might have been argued that a manufacturer, as a
reasonably prudent person, could not forsee harm to anyone other
*than his immediate vendee, or that a subsequent sale by such vendee
was not natural or probable, but today such an argument is groundless.
It is the rule now rather than the exception that a manufacturer sells
to one other than the actual consumer. The modern economic trend has
been to place more and more middlemen between the manufacturer and
the consumer. The forseeability of harm to an ultimate consumer is
just as apparent today as was harm to the immediate vendee a hundred years ago; and harm to an ultimate consumer is just as much the
natural and probable result of the negligence of the manufacturer today as was harm to the immediate vendee a hundred years ago. The
rule requiring privity is no longer a rule, and the exceptions to that
rule are no longer exceptions, but are statements of the actual circum29
stances necessary to find tort liability in negligence.
Wisconsin has followed the majority of the states and has laid
down privity as a requirement to recovery on the grounds of negligence. This rule was stated in the case of Benzor v. Howell30 as follows:
"Subject to certain well defined exceptions it is the general
rule that manufacturers are not liable for damages to persons
with whom they have no contractual relations for personal injuries sustained by such persons because of the negligent manufacture of their product."
and again in Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Corp.:31
"It is a general rule that manufacturers are not liable for
damages to persons with whom they have no contractual relations for personal injuries sustained by such persons because
of the negligent manufacture of their product. This is for the
reason, it is said, that an injury to any other person than the
owner for whom the article is built and to whom it is delivered
cannot ordinarily be forseen or reasonably anticipated as the
probable result of the negligence in its construction."
That case went on to hold the seller of a used car with defective brakes
liable to a third party on the basis of the exception in the McPherson
case. Wisconsin has also adopted the thr e exceptions to the privity
rule.32 Hence no privity need be shown (and a duty to use care will
lie) in the case of (1) inherently dangerous articles, 33 (2) articles not
inherently dangerous but made imminently so by reason of their de29 This is the view taken by the American Law Institute in the Restatement.
30203 Wis. 1, 233 N.W. 758 (1930).
31 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928).
s2 Wickham, ProductsLiability in Wisconsin, 29 MARQ. L. REv. 20 (1938).

3 Coakley v. Prentiss-Wabers Stove Co., 182 Wis. 94, 195 N.W. 388 (1923).
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fective manufacture,3 4 and (3) articles intended to preserve or affect
human life, limb or health. 35 An intimation of the true nature of these
exceptions was indicated in the case of Hasbrouck v. Armour & Co.,36
where recovery was denied without privity because the harm was too
unusual and remote. In that case the Wisconsin Supreme Court said:
".... there is in the common law no authority for imposing
special duties upon him (the manufacturer) by reason of any
privity between him and the vendee of his vendee, except in
the instances mentioned (the exceptions to the rule), which may
be regarded as occasions of a general duty toward the public
to whom the wares are offered, or as exceptions to the rule of
non-liability."
Ii is apparent that the courts are refusing to find a tort duty where
ao privity is present rather than actually making privity a requirement
to recovery in negligence. However, the generally accepted statement
of the rule permits the courts to deny recovery without looking into
the actual facts of forseeability or causation. The result has been to
make the law in this field lag far behind the fast developing commercial trends. An opposing reaction to the technical limitation of this
rule has taken the form of extending the exception in the McPherson
case to any and all types of fact situations.3 7 As long as this is done,
not as an exception to a rule requiring privity, but as a requirement for
the rising of a tort duty, the courts can develop consistent rules to cover
the field. One solution would be to do away with all mention of
privity and impose liability on the same broad general grounds, and
with the same limitations, as in any other field of negligence. 38 Such
a stand would dispel a great deal of the confusion and the wide var39
iance of opinion which has risen in this field.
The field of tort also offers another solution to one of the many
problems of manufacturers' liability. In the case of inherently dangerous articles, strict liability could be imposed on the grounds that public
policy requires it. This is in effect what was done in the case of Jacob
Decker & Sons, Inc.'v. Capps,40 but there the court called it breach
4 Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Corp., supra, n. 31..
35Haley v. Swift & Co., 152 Wis. 570, 140 N.W. 292 (1913).
36139 Wis. 357, 121 N.W4 157. (1909).
37
See 140 A.L.R. 243 (1942).
38 Massachusetts has done this expressly in Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass.

92, 64 N.E. 2d 693. (1946).

39 The ultimate consumer's burden is further increased by the inherent difficulty

in proving negligence. Most courts have allowed the use of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur as an aid in this proof. PRossER, Toirrs §43; Carpenter, The
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 1 U. OF CHL L. R1v. 519 (1934); Heckel and
Harper, Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 22 ILL. L. REv. 724
(1928). Another aid has been negligence per se by showing the violation of a
criminal statute. 65 C.J.S. Negligence §100. 620; MvAleavey v. Lowe, 259 Wis.
463, 49 N.W. 2d 487 (1951). Both of these aspects of the subject are beyond
the scope of this article.

4oSupra, n. 11.
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of implied warranty rather than strict liability and thereby confused the
rest of the law of warranties. The policy argument in the case of food,
drugs, explosives and the like is very strong for strict liability, but if
such liability is to be imposed it should be done in the name of tort
where it belongs, and thereby eliminate all the difficulties inherent in
the word warranty. Strict liability is tort in nature and should be imposed as such.
IV

CONCLUSION

As seen from the above discussion, the vast majority of the courts
have come to the conclusion that a greater liability should be imposed
on the manufacturer of goods in favor of the ultimate consumer.
However, with two fields, contract and tort, competing for the basis
of liability, these courts have arrived at a great variety of results, depending on the viewpoint taken. The greatest single difficulty in this
field seems to be the confusion of nomenclature. Imposition of tort
liability under the name of warranty, and insisting on privity as a requirement to recovery in negligence, have served to confuse legal
thought as to the limitations of either field. The simplest way to reduce this chaos would be to restrict the contract and tort liabilities
to their respective spheres and not to intermix both the law and the
terminology. Both fields have their own drawbacks in proving liability:
warranty requiring all the contractual elements, and negligence requiring a degree of proof impractical for a consumer.4 ' For a logical solution to the problems in both 'fields, however, it seems desireable to
make the distinctions between them very sharp, and then to solve
each field's problems in that field. Since the term warranty almost
universally connotes a contractual duty, this word should be restricted
to obligations arising out of contractual relationships and not be used
to denote a tort obligation. Likewise, the law of negligence should be
freed from the hundred year old restrictions which have entangled it
and should be stated for what it actually is, the obligation of an individual to society to so conduct himself as to avoid unreasonable risk
of harm to others. By bearing these elementary distinctions in mind,
the courts can develop both fields logically and without the inevitable
confusion which results from their interdependence.
ROBERT

41 Supra, n. 39.
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